Why should the baby live?

On 23 February 2012, Dr. Francesca Minerva, a research associate at Oxford University and the University of Melbourne and Alberto Giubilini, a bioethicist at the universities of Milan and Melbourne had their article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ published in The Journal of Medical Ethics.

This said:

"People with Down's syndrome, as well as people affected by many other severe disabilities, are often reported to be happy. Nonetheless, to bring up such children might be an unbearable burden on the family and on society as a whole, when the state economically provides for their care. On these grounds, THE FACT THAT A FETUS HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A PERSON WHO WILL HAVE AN (AT LEAST) ACCEPTABLE LIFE IS NO REASON FOR PROHIBITING ABORTION. Therefore, we argue that, when circumstances occur after birth such that they would have justified abortion, what we call AFTER-BIRTH ABORTION SHOULD BE PERMISSIBLE…

We propose to call this practice ‘after-birth abortion’, rather than ‘infanticide’, to emphasise that the moral status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which ‘abortions’ in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child.

Therefore, WE CLAIM THAT KILLING A NEWBORN COULD BE ETHICALLY PERMISSIBLE IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE ABORTION WOULD BE. Such circumstances include cases where the newborn has the potential to have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well-being of the family is at risk. Accordingly, a second terminological specification is that we call such a practice ‘after-birth abortion’ rather than ‘euthanasia’ because THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ONE WHO DIES IS NOT NECESSARILY THE PRIMARY CRITERION FOR THE CHOICE, contrary to what happens in the case of euthanasia.

Failing to bring a new person into existence cannot be compared with the wrong caused by procuring the death of an existing person… If the death of a newborn is not wrongful to her on the grounds that she cannot have formed any aim that she is prevented from accomplishing, then IT SHOULD ALSO BE PERMISSIBLE TO PRACTISE AN AFTER-BIRTH ABORTION ON A HEALTHY NEWBORN TOO, GIVEN THAT SHE HAS NOT FORMED ANY AIM YET...

The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, NEITHER CAN BE CONSIDERED A ‘PERSON’ in a morally relevant sense… MERELY BEING HUMAN IS NOT IN ITSELF A REASON FOR ASCRIBING SOMEONE A RIGHT TO LIFE…

Now, hardly can a newborn be said to have aims, as the future we imagine for it is merely a projection of our minds on its potential lives. It might start having expectations and develop a minimum level of self-awareness at a very early stage, but not in the first days or few weeks after birth. On the other hand, not only aims but also well-developed plans are concepts that certainly apply to those people (parents, siblings, society) who could be negatively or positively affected by the birth of that child. Therefore, the rights and interests of the actual people involved should represent the prevailing consideration in a decision about abortion and after-birth abortion…

Although FETUSES AND NEWBORNS ARE NOT PERSONS, they are potential persons because they can develop, thanks to their own biological mechanisms, those properties which will make them ‘persons’ in the sense of ‘subjects of a moral right to life’…

If a potential person, like a fetus and a newborn, does not become an actual person, like you and us, then there is neither an actual nor a future person who can be harmed, which means that THERE IS NO HARM AT ALL. So, if you ask one of us if we would have been harmed, had our parents decided to kill us when we were fetuses or newborns, our answer is ‘no’, because THEY WOULD HAVE HARMED SOMEONE WHO DOES NOT EXIST (the ‘us’ whom you are asking the question), which means no one. And if no one is harmed, then no harm occurred.

A consequence of this position is that THE INTERESTS OF ACTUAL PEOPLE OVER-RIDE THE INTEREST OF MERELY POTENTIAL PEOPLE TO BECOME ACTUAL ONES…

The ALLEGED right of individuals (such as fetuses and newborns) to develop their potentiality, which someone defends, is over-ridden by the interests of actual people (parents, family, society) to pursue their own well-being because, as we have just argued, merely POTENTIAL PEOPLE CANNOT BE HARMED BY NOT BEING BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE.

Actual people's well-being could be threatened by the new (even if healthy) child requiring energy, money and care which the family might happen to be in short supply of. Sometimes this situation can be prevented through an abortion, but in some other cases this is not possible. In these cases, SINCE NON-PERSONS HAVE NO MORAL RIGHTS TO LIFE, THERE ARE NO REASONS FOR BANNING AFTER-BIRTH ABORTIONS…

A possible objection to our argument is that after-birth abortion should be practised just on potential people who could never have a life worth living. Accordingly, healthy and potentially happy people should be given up for adoption if the family cannot raise them up. Why should we kill a healthy newborn when giving it up for adoption would not breach anyone's right but possibly increase the happiness of people involved (adopters and adoptee)?…

What we are suggesting is that, if interests of actual people should prevail, then AFTER-BIRTH ABORTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A PERMISSIBLE OPTION FOR WOMEN WHO WOULD BE DAMAGED BY GIVING UP THEIR NEWBORNS FOR ADOPTION.

If criteria such as the costs (social, psychological, economic) for the potential parents are good enough reasons for having an abortion even when the fetus is healthy, if the moral status of the newborn is the same as that of the infant and if neither has any moral value by virtue of being a potential person, then THE SAME REASONS WHICH JUSTIFY ABORTION SHOULD ALSO JUSTIFY THE KILLING OF THE POTENTIAL PERSON WHEN IT IS AT THE STAGE OF A NEWBORN...

If economical, social or psychological circumstances change such that taking care of the offspring becomes an unbearable burden on someone, then people should be given the chance of not being forced to do something they cannot afford." After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?

Julian Savulescu, Professor of Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of St Cross College and a Director of the Oxford Centre for Practical Ethics, the editor of The Journal of Medical Ethics, and thus responsible for the publication of the above, insisted that the arguments had been made before by eminent figures.

"I’m not defending practising infanticide... I’m defending academic and intellectual freedom."

So that’s all right then.

As of this moment, Melbourne and Oxford Universities are jointly involved in high-powered Stem Cell research. Savulescu heads this collaborative venture.

I wonder, when the followers of Francesca Minerva and Alberto Giubilini extinguish the life of their first ‘healthy newborn’, with the defenders of ‘academic and intellectual freedom’ nodding benignly in the background, will that newborn be Italian or Romanian?

Or is it likely to have been born a little closer to Oxford?